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The Preemptive Effect of Federal




The Federal Communications Act (FCA), which was
originally enacted in 1934, is the primary means by which the
federal government regulates the telecommunications industry. 2
Because telecommunications services are used in interstate
commerce, Congress has the power to effect such regulation
through the Commerce Clause.3 With regard to consumer
telecommunications contracts, the FCA embodies a policy of fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. 4  "Fair" and
"reasonable" are standards which are adjudicated by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and thus open to
interpretation during the regulatory process.5
"Nondiscriminatory" limits any "unjust or unreasonable"
discrimination based on persons, classes of persons, or
localities.6 These policies are codified at 47 USC §§ 201-02 and
were formally enforced by the tariffing mechanism of 47 USC
§ 203 prior to the detariffing of telecommunications markets by
t BS 2009, University of Oklahoma; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago
Law School. I am grateful to Joan Neal and Melanie Harmon for their insightful
comments.
1 Communications Act of 1934 (Federal Communications Act), Pub L No 73-416, 48
Stat 1064, codified as amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq.
2 Glen 0. Robinson and Thomas B. Nachbar, Communications Regulation 13
(Thomson/West 2008).
3 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3. See also Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co v
United States, 234 US 342, 350-60 (1914).
4 See 47 USC §§ 201-02.
5 See 47 USC § 201(b).
6 See 47 USC § 202(a).
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the FCC7 pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996
("1996 Act").8  Under the § 203 tariffing regime,
telecommunications carriers were required to file tariffs that
stated their "charges, classifications, regulations, [and]
practices" with the FCC.9 These tariffs governed both the rates
for exchange service between telecommunications carriers and
the rates, terms, and conditions of service offered to
consumers. 10 The filing of these tariffs raised the issue of
whether this regulation by the FCC preempted state law
requirements for consumer contracts. When the tariffing regime
was in effect, parties litigated the question of whether the FCA
preempted state law. The Supreme Court ultimately resolved
that issue, holding that federal law preempted state law
challenges to the rates, terms, and conditions of service
embodied in the tariffing mechanism." However, the FCC
deregulated the telecommunications market for interstate,
domestic, interexchange services in 1996 and abolished the
tariffing mechanism for these services.12 Because regulation by
the FCC is less direct in a detariffed regime, courts now disagree
as to whether §§ 201-02 continue to exert preemptive force
against state law contract requirements. Specifically, over the
last decade, three appellate courts have weighed in-with
differing results-on the question of whether the detariffed FCA
preempts state law challenges to consumer telecommunications
contracts.13
This Comment argues that recent decisions of the Supreme
Court suggest an innovative resolution to this circuit split. Part
I provides background on the FCA and describes the
environment in which the circuit split emerged. Part II details
the current state of the law, including the circuit split, and
7 See In the Matter of Policy & Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace, 11 FCC 20730 (1996) ("Detariffing Order").
8 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (amending the FCA).
9 47 USC § 203.
10 See id.
" See American Telephone & Telegraph Co v Central Office Telephone, Inc, 524 US
214, 221-28 (1998).
12 See generally Detariffing Order, 11 FCC 20730 (cited in note 7).
13 See In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practice Litigation, 619 F3d
1188, 1202 (10th Cir 2010) (holding that state law challenges are preempted); Ting v
AT&T, 319 F3d 1126, 1146 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that state law challenges are not
preempted); Boomer v AT&T Corp, 309 F3d 404, 423 (7th Cir 2002) (holding that state
law challenges are preempted).
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contrasts the analytical approaches of the relevant circuit
courts. Part III discusses two recent Supreme Court decisions:
Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc v Metrophones
Telecommunications, Incl4 and Arizona v United States.15 Part
III first argues that the decision in Global Crossing suggests
that the uniformity principle of §§ 201-03 which operated
preemptively predetariffing continues to operate preemptively
postdetariffing. Next, Part III asserts that the decision in
Arizona stands for the proposition that Congressional non-
regulation of a portion of a regulated field, as in the
postdetariffing enforcement of §§ 201-02 by the FCC, exerts
preemptive effect against state regulation of that portion of the
field. Lastly, Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the FCA and the Filed-Rate Doctrine
In 1934, Congress enacted the FCA,'6 which created the
FCC and transferred regulation of the telecommunications
market from the Interstate Commerce Commission 7 to the
FCC. 18 The stated purpose of the FCA was to "make available
... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges."19 To further this goal, §§ 201 and 202 of the
FCA established a policy of just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory telecommunications service. 20 Specifically,
§ 201 required that "[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and
regulations . . . shall be just and reasonable," 21 while § 202 made
it unlawful for any carrier to "make any unjust or unreasonable
discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations,
facilities, or services" or to "make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
14 550 US 45 (2007).
15 132 S Ct 2492 (2012).
16 Communications Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, codified as
amended at 47 USC § 151 et seq.
" Robinson and Nachbar, Communications at 440 (cited in note 2).
1s 48 Stat at 1064.
1 48 Stat at 1064.
20 See 47 USC §§ 201-02.
21 47 USC § 201(b).
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class of persons, or locality."22 Section 203 of the FCA
established the enforcement mechanism for the policy of just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory service created by §§ 201-02:
a system of filed tariffs administered by the FCC. 23 Under this
system, telecommunications carriers were required to file
tariffs-extensive documents which detailed the rates and terms
of the service they would provide-with the FCC showing "all
charges . . . and . .. the classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such charges." 24 While carriers were free to file tariffs
proposing any rates or terms of service, the FCC had the
authority to reject tariffs which did not conform to the just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory requirements of §§ 201-0225
and to prescribe just and reasonable charges if the tariff filed by
the carrier was unlawful under §§ 201-02.26
Once the filed tariff had been accepted by the FCC, the
carrier was prohibited from offering rates and terms different in
any respect from those stated in the tariff.27 This prohibition is
known as the "filed-rate doctrine," and the Supreme Court
applied it to the telecommunications service in American
Telephone & Telegraph Co v Central Office Telephone, Inc.28 In
that case, the Court reasoned that because § 203(c) was modeled
after similar provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA),
the "filed-rate doctrine" of the ICA was applicable in the FCA
context as well.29 Accordingly, the Court extended the principles
of the ICA filed-rate doctrine, which requires that transportation
22 47 USC § 202(a).
23 See 47 USC § 203.
24 47 USC § 203(a).
25 See 47 USC § 204.
26 See 47 USC § 205.
27 See 47 USC § 203(c).
28 524 US 214 (1998).
29 Id at 222. For the ICA's filed-rate doctrine, see 49 USC § 13702(a) ("The
carrier may not charge or receive a different compensation for the transportation or
service than the rate specified in the tariff, whether by returning a part of that rate to a
person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of a facility that affects the value of
that transportation or service, or another device."). Compare this provision with the
FCA's filed-rate doctrine provision found in 47 USC § 203(c) ("[N]o carrier shall (1)
charge, demand, collect, or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such
communication, or for any service in connection therewith, between the points named in
any such schedule than the charges specified in the schedule then in effect, or (2) refund
or remit by any means or device any portion of the charges so specified, or (3) extend to
any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any
classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in
such schedule.").
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carriers not extend rates or terms of service that differ from the
carriers' filed tariffs, to telecommunications carriers.30 The
Court went on to hold that the filed-rate doctrine operating
within the FCC's regulatory regime preempted state law
challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of telecommunications
service.31
B. The Evolving Telecommunications Market and the 1996 Act
Prior to the 1970s, AT&T held a nearly complete monopoly
on the market for telecommunications services. 32 The FCC
allowed this monopoly because AT&T persuaded it that
telecommunications service was a "natural monopoly"-an
economic area in which economies of scale, economies of scope,
and network effects combined such that the most efficient
economic system consisted of a single service provider. 33 In the
early 1970s, the natural monopoly concept began to erode-most
notably with the Department of Justice's commencement in
1974 of the antitrust suit which would eventually break up
AT&T.34 In the absence of a natural monopoly justification,
competition was the natural regime to which regulators turned.
In 1985, the FCC responded to this trend by attempting to
exempt nondominant carriers-those other than AT&T-from
the § 203 tariff-filing requirement. 35 In 1989, AT&T responded
to the FCC's exemption of nondominant carriers by filing suit
pursuant to § 203 to prevent MCI, a smaller rival, from
operating with unfiled rates. 36 The Supreme Court resolved this
litigation in 1994, when the Court held that the FCC lacked the
power to modify the FCA in this way.37 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that the FCC's partial exemption amounted to a
30 Central Office, 524 US at 222.
31 Id at 221-28.
32 See Robinson and Nachbar, Communications at 439-40 (cited in note 2).
3 See id at 440-42.
3 See United States v American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 552 F Supp
131 (DDC 1982). See also Robinson and Nachbar, Communications at 442 (cited in
note 2).
3 In the Matter of Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services & Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 99 FCC2d 1020, 1020-22 (1985).
36 See MCI Telecommunications Corp v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 512
US 218, 222 (1994).
3 See id at 231-32.
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fundamental revision of the statute, which was a change that
only Congress could make.38
In response to this ruling, Congress passed the 1996 Act,39
which "effectively adopted the FCC's detariffing rationale."40
Specifically, the 1996 Act instructed the FCC to "forbear from
applying any regulation or any provision of th[e FCA]" if the
FCC determined that (1) such forbearance was consistent with
the goals of §§ 201-02; (2) enforcement of the regulation was not
necessary to protect consumers; and (3) forbearance was
consistent with the public interest. 41 Later that year, the FCC
found that these conditions were met as to all carriers, including
AT&T, whose dominant market share had sharply fallen in
recent years.42 Based on this finding, the FCC issued an order of
mandatory detariffing for the telecommunications market for
interstate, domestic, interexchange services.43
C. The Detariffing Process: Setting the Stage for Modern
Preemption Litigation
According to the FCC's 1996 detariffing order,
telecommunications carriers were allowed to negotiate rates,
terms, and conditions of their service directly with consumers,
rather than filing tariffs with the FCC.4 4 The FCC anticipated
that carriers would enter into "short, standard contracts" with
consumerS45 and emphasized that the §§ 201-02 requirements of
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms were still in effect. 46
3 Id.
3 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (amending the FCA).
40 Ting v AT&T, 319 F3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir 2003).
41 47 USC § 160(a).
42 At this point, AT&T was no longer the dominant power it once was. The
monopoly of AT&T was shattered when it was broken up by United States v American
Telephone and Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 223 (DDC 1982) ("[Tjhe Federal
Communications Commission has struggled, largely without success, to stop
[anticompetitive] practices .... Some other remedy is plainly required; hence the
divestiture of the local Operating Companies from the Bell System."). In 1995, AT&T
sought and received reclassification as a non-dominant carrier in the interstate,
domestic, interexchange market. See In the Matter of Motion of AT&T Corp to Be
Reclassified As A Non-Dominant Carrier, 11 FCC 3271, 3273 (1995).
43 See Detariffing Order, 11 FCC at 20731-33 (cited in note 7).
4 Id at 20818-20.
4 Id at 20763.
46 See id at 20803 ("Our decision to forbear from requiring nondominant
interexchange carriers to file tariffs for interstate, domestic, interexchange services does
not affect such carriers' obligations under Sections 201 and 202 to charge rates, and to
568 [ 2013
PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF POSTDETARIFFING
The detariffing order also provided that "in the absence of
tariffs, consumers will be able to pursue remedies under state
consumer protection and contract laws in a manner currently
precluded by the 'filed-rate' doctrine."47
That language alarmed AT&T, which filed a petition
requesting that the FCC confirm that "federal, and not state,
law governs the determination as to whether a nondominant
interexchange carrier's rates, terms, and conditions for
interstate, domestic, interexchange services are lawful."48 In
response, the FCC issued an Order on Reconsideration, which
stated that the FCA "continues to govern determinations as to
whether rates, terms, and conditions for . .. services are just and
reasonable.... [T]he [FCA] does not govern other issues, such
as contract formation and breach of contract, that arise in a
detariffed environment."4 9 With this assertion by the FCC, the
question of whether the FCA preempts state law challenges to
the rates, terms, and conditions of contracts for
telecommunications services came to the forefront.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Federal Preemption Doctrine and the Preemptive Effect of
§§ 201-02
There are three situations in which, pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,5 0 state law is preempted
by federal law: (1) express preemption, which occurs when a
statute has an "express provision for preemption"; (2) field
preemption, which occurs when "Congress intends federal law to
occupy the field"; and (3) conflict preemption, in which state law
is preempted "to the extent of any conflict with a federal
statute."5 1 Because the FCA contains no express preemption
provision, the first situation is irrelevant in the FCA context. 5 2
impose practices, classifications and regulations, that are just and reasonable and not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.").
47 Detariffing Order, 11 FCC at 20751 (cited in note 7).
4 In the Matter of Policy & Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace, 12 FCC 15014, 15056 (1997) ("Order on Reconsideration").
" Id at 15057.
5 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
5' Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 372 (2000).
52 See In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practice Litigation, 619 F3d
1188, 1196 (10th Cir 2010) ("Because §§ 201 and 202 of the FCA do not contain an
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In addition, the circuit courts which have addressed the issue
have generally concluded that there is no field preemption in the
FCA context because state law has some role to play in
regulation of the telecommunications industry.53 The crux of the
disagreement between these circuit courts is whether, through
the conflict preemption doctrine, §§ 201-02 prevent state law
from regulating rates, terms, and conditions of
telecommunications service contracts. 54
Conflict preemption occurs if it is impossible for private
parties to comply with federal and state law simultaneously or if
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and methods of Congress.55 The first case, in which it
is impossible to comply with federal and state law requirements
simultaneously, is known as actual conflict preemption.5 6 The
second case, in which state law stands as a barrier to the full
accomplishment of the purposes and methods intended by
Congress, is known as obstacle conflict preemption.57 With
regard to the conflict between state law standards for consumer
contracts and FCA §§ 201-02, there is no actual conflict
preemption because it is possible for telecommunications
providers to comply with both the FCA and state law. Rather,
the question raised is a question of obstacle conflict preemption:
express preemption provision, only field and conflict preemption are at issue in this
case."); Ting v AT&T, 319 F3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir 2003) ("Sections 201(b) and 202(a) do
not contain preemptive text, so express preemption is not an issue here.").
r Two circuit courts held that there is no field preemption while one circuit court
thought it likely that there is no field preemption but declined to reach the issue. See In
re Universal, 619 F3d at 1196 ("The FCC's detariffing orders, however, explicitly
contemplate a role for state law . . . . Accordingly, because state law expressly
supplements federal law in the regulation of interstate telecommunications carriers,
field preemption does not apply.") (citation omitted); Ting, 319 F3d at 1136, quoting
Marcus v AT&T Corp, 138 F3d 46, 54 (2d Cir 1998) ("[Flield preemption is not an issue
because state law unquestionably plays a role. . .. [Tihe Communications Act does not
'manifest a clear Congressional intent to preempt state law actions prohibiting deceptive
business practices, false advertising, or common-law fraud."') (citations omitted); Boomer
v AT & T Corp, 309 F3d 404, 424 (7th Cir 2002) ("Prior to detariffing, this court held that
the Federal Communications Act completely preempted state law challenges ....
[Flollowing detariffing, there appears to be some role for state law .... But we need not
resolve this issue today.") (citations omitted).
4 See In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1196; Ting, 319 F3d at 1146; Boomer, 309 F3d
at 417.
5s English v General Electric Co, 496 US 72, 79 (1990).
5 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v Paul, 373 US 132, 142-43 (1963) for
a concise discussion of actual conflict preemption.
5 See Crosby, 530 US at 372-73 for a concise discussion of obstacle conflict
preemption.
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do state law challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of
telecommunications contracts conflict with the purposes and
methods intended by Congress in enacting the FCA?
In the FCA context, the Seventh Circuit held in 2002 in
Boomer v AT & T Corp5 8 that the FCA preempts state law
challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of consumer
telecommunications contracts through obstacle conflict
preemption.5 9 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit in Ting v AT&TO split
with the Seventh, holding that such challenges are not
preempted by the FCA.6 1 Finally, in 2010, the Tenth Circuit in
In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practice
Litigation62 sided with the Seventh and held that such
challenges are preempted by the FCA.63
B. The Boomer Decision: State Law Challenges Preempted
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to address
the preemption issue when it ruled that state law-based
challenges to the validity of arbitration clauses in consumer
telecommunications contracts were preempted.64 In Boomer, the
plaintiff filed a putative class action against AT&T alleging that
AT&T had overcharged consumers.65 AT&T moved to compel
individual arbitration pursuant to the terms of the service
agreement with the plaintiff.6 6 The district court denied the
motion based on "genuine issues of material fact" as to whether
the arbitration clause was valid under Illinois state law. 67 AT&T
appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which ruled that the FCA
preempted Boomer's state law challenge to the arbitration
" 309 F3d 404 (7th Cir 2002).
5 See id at 417.
6 319 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 2003).
61 Id at 1146 ("[N]either [of the state laws under which this challenge was brought]
conflicts with § 201(b) or § 202(a), because neither law interferes with Congress' chosen
method in effectuating the purposes of the federal law.").
62 619 F3d 1188 (10th Cir 2010).
' Id at 1201 ("[A]lthough detariffing ended the strict uniformity imposed by § 203's
filed-rate doctrine, it did not lessen the preemptive force of the uniformity requirements
that remained in §§ 201 and 202."). See also notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
6 Boomer, 309 F3d at 418.
65 Id at 410.
' Id at 411.
67 Id.
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clause.68 The court also impliedly held that the FCA preempted
all state law challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of
consumer telecommunications contracts. 69
The Seventh Circuit provided three main reasons for its
decision that the state law challenge was preempted. First,
§§ 201-02, "and the [FCA] in general, demonstrate a
congressional intent that customers of individual long-distance
carriers receive uniform terms and conditions of service," a
policy that would be contravened by permitting this state law
challenge. 70 Regarding the statutory language, the Boomer court
first concluded that "[s]ections 201 and 202, read together,
demonstrate a congressional intent that individual long-distance
customers throughout the United States receive uniform rates,
terms and conditions of service."71 To bolster this assertion, the
court looked to the Supreme Court's holding in Central Office
that §§ 201-02 exhibit a policy of antidiscrimination. 7 2 Yet, as
the Boomer court observed, permitting "a state law challenge to
the validity of the terms and conditions of a telephone service
agreement would result in the application of fifty bodies of law,
and this would inevitably lead to customers in different states
receiving different terms and conditions," thereby violating the
uniformity principle. 73
Second, the Court reasoned that because the purportedly
unfavorable arbitration terms were priced into the service rate,
invalidating such terms in some states but not in others would
lead to discriminatory pricing. 74 Specifically, the court
recognized that "arbitration offers cost-saving benefits to
telecommunication providers" and that irregularly voiding these
clauses based on contradictory state laws would reduce the
overall cost savings.75  Faced with increased costs,
6 Boomer, 309 F3d at 423.
69 See id ("Allowing state law challenges to the validity of the terms and conditions
contained in long-distance contracts, however, results in the very discrimination
Congress sought to prevent.... Section 201(b) clearly demonstrates Congress's intent
that federal law determine the fairness and reasonableness of contractual terms, as
opposed to state law principles such as unconscionability.").
70 Id at 418.
n1 Id.
72 Boomer, 309 F3d at 418, citing Central Office, 524 US at 223.
7 Boomer, 309 F3d at 418.
74 Id at 419.
75 Id.
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telecommunications carriers would increase rates in states
which disallowed arbitration agreements but not in states which
allowed them.76 The court concluded that allowing challenges to
the arbitration clause based on state law would inevitably lead
to some form of price discrimination.7 7 While the court conceded
that the uniformity principle only prohibited "unreasonable" or
"undue" discrimination, it found that the "labyrinth" of differing
rates, terms, and conditions that would result indeed violated
the uniformity principle.78
Third, because § 201 "declares unlawful rates, terms and
conditions which are not just and reasonable, [it] demonstrat[es]
Congress's intent that federal law govern the validity of the
terms and conditions of long-distance service contracts."79 The
court reasoned that any challenge to the terms and conditions of
a long-distance service contract-even a challenge based on
state law unconscionability or consumer protection grounds-
was essentially a claim that the terms and conditions were not
fair and reasonable. 0 Thus, allowing such state law-based
challenges would "open the door for direct conflicts between
federal and state law on the validity of terms and conditions
contained in a long-distance service contract."81 This result
would contradict the method of FCA enforcement intended by
Congress-regulation by the FCC.82
Finally, the Boomer court addressed the plaintiffs
contention that the demise of the § 203 tariffing process opened
the door for state law challenges. The court disagreed, finding
that § 203 "merely served as a mechanism by which the FCC
could assure compliance with the standards set forth in Sections
201 and 202."83 Following the FCC's detariffing order, the
substantive requirements of §§ 201 and 202 remain. 84
76 Id.
7 Boomer, 309 F3d at 419-20.
78 Id at 420.
7 Id at 418.
8 Id at 421 ("While Boomer challenges the arbitration clause under the state law
doctrine of unconscionability and various state consumer protection statutes, in essence
the question is the same-whether the term is fair and reasonable.").
8' Boomer, 309 F3d at 421.
82 Id (holding that a regime in which federal law could favor arbitration clauses
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Accordingly, the court held that the intention of Congress in
passing the 1996 Act was that the FCC continue to ensure
compliance with §§ 201-02 post-detariffing. 85 Specifically, the
court held that the FCC retained power to regulate the
telecommunications market to ensure uniform and reasonable
rates, terms, and conditions and that consumers retained their
ability to challenge unfair rates, terms, and conditions under
FCA § 208.86
C. The Ting Decision: State Law Challenges Not Preempted
The Ninth Circuit split with the Seventh Circuit in 2003
when it issued its decision in Ting, holding that the state law-
based claims brought by the plaintiffs in that case were not
preempted.87 In Ting, the plaintiff brought a state class-action
suit alleging that AT&T's new consumer service agreement
(CSA) violated California's consumer protection and contract
laws. 88 The district court ruled that the FCA did not preempt
state law challenges to the terms of the CSA because "Congress
removed the filing requirement with the intention of ending the
preemptive regime of the filed-rate doctrine." 89 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.90 In ruling that the
plaintiff's state law challenges were not preempted, the Ninth
Circuit analyzed two main issues: (1) whether allowing state law
challenges to proceed was compatible with the purpose of the
FCA following the 1996 amendment that allowed detariffing by
the FCC; and (2) whether allowing state law challenges to
5 Boomer, 309 F3d at 421-22, quoting 47 USC § 160(a)(1) ("Congress believes that
these goals can be met without tariffs. In fact, in authorizing the FCC to forego the
tariff-filing requirement, Congress required the FCC to first assure itself that the filing
of a tariff was 'not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or
regulations ... are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably
discriminatory."').
88 Id.
8 See Ting, 319 F3d at 1146 ("'We therefore conclude that neither the CLRA nor
California's unconscionability law conflicts with § 201(b) or § 202(a), because neither law
interferes with Congress' chosen method in effectuating the purposes of the
federal law.").
' Id at 1134.
89 Id.
9 Id at 1152 ("In sum, we affirm the district court's conclusion that the Legal
Remedies Provisions are unenforceable as unconscionable under California law, the
application of which is not preempted by §§ 201(b) and 202(a) of the Federal
Communications Act.").
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proceed was compatible with the method chosen by Congress to
enact that purpose.91
The Ting court first asked whether §§ 201-02, standing
alone, embody a congressional purpose of uniformity in rates,
terms, and conditions of service. For a variety of reasons, the
court answered in the negative. First, relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the court reasoned that the principle of uniformity
arose from the nondiscrimination principles of §§ 201-02 in
combination with the tariffing requirements of § 203.92 To
support this finding, the court referenced "nearly 70 years of
case law[, which] plainly demonstrate[d] that the principle of
uniformity [was] not derived from § 202(a) alone, but from the
mandate to publish rates" contained in § 203.93 Second, the court
observed that §§ 201-02 had never before been invoked to
preempt state law regulation of rates, terms, and conditions on
the basis of uniformity-that role had always been reserved for
§ 203.94 Third, the Ting court relied on these first two points to
conclude that without § 203, the congressional intention to
preempt state law ceased to exist.95 Specifically, while the court
observed that the "substantive principles of reasonableness and
nondiscrimination remain[ed] intact," and thus continued to
govern telecommunications contracts, it found that preemption
by uniformity "was a product of the filed rate doctrine which, by
definition, did not survive detariffing."9 6
Fourth, the court distinguished precedent that seemed to
suggest the existence of an independent uniformity principle in
§ 202(a)97 by noting that the cases pointing to that conclusion
Ting, 319 F3d at 1138 ("We first examine the purpose of §§ 201(b) and 202(a) and
then discuss Congress' chosen method to effectuate the statutes' objectives in the
detariffed environment.").
92 See id.
9 Id. See also 47 USC § 203(a) ("Every common carrier, except connecting carriers,
shall, within such reasonable time as the Commission shall designate, file with the
Commission and print and keep open for public inspection schedules showing all charges
... and showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting
such charges.").
9 Ting, 319 F3d at 1138 ("[Slave for Boomer, no court has ever referred to § 201 or
§ 202 in declaring a carrier's tariff immune from state-law challenge. That role had
always been reserved for § 203 and the filed rate doctrine.").
9 Id at 1139.
96 Id.
9 See 47 USC § 202(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any
unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations,
facilities, or services ... or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or
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were all heard under regulatory schemes that "included some
form of a federal tariff filing requirement."98 In contrast, the
current regulatory environment "is completely detariffed and
highly competitive."99 Fifth, the court observed that even when
§§ 201-02 were interpreted in the context of a tariffed market,
some amount of reasonable variation in terms and conditions
was allowable.100 For example, the court noted that in the
tariffed regime, "contractual differences between customers of
different states violated § 202(a) only if those differences lack a
neutral and rational basis." 01 Finally, the Ting court
characterized the Boomer court's holding that the uniformity
principle survived detariffing as "mere identification of favorable
text," when in fact a clear finding of congressional purpose is
required to support such a conclusion of preemption of state
law. 102
Having found that allowing state law challenges did not
conflict with the congressional purpose underlying the FCA, the
Ting court next examined the issue of whether permitting such
challenges conflicted with the method of enforcement Congress
intended.103 The central question in the Court's analysis of this
issue was whether the detariffing process represented a minor
modification in the FCC's enforcement power or a significant
shift away from the allocation of enforcement responsibility to
the FCC.104 First, the court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's opinion in MCI Telecommunications Corp v American
Telephone & Telegraph Co 05 to show that the tariffing
requirements of § 203 were central to the enforcement of the
FCA.106 Indeed, in MCI, the Supreme Court described the tariff-
filing requirement as "the heart of the common-carrier section of
advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality.").
98 Ting, 319 F3d at 1139.
9 Id.
'00 Id at 1140.
101 Id.
102 Ting, 319 F3d at 1141 ("A finding of obstruction, however, depends on more than
a mere identification of favorable text. Indeed, we recognize that § 202(a) evinces a
congressional intent that customers receive non-preferential treatment. But, in order to
determine whether Congress' goals are truly being frustrated, the obstruction inquiry
examines congressional purpose.").
103 Id at 1141.
10 Id.
105 512 US 218 (1994).
16 Ting, 319 F3d at 1141-42.
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the Communications Act."107 Next, the Ting court pointed to the
fact that Congress had not replaced § 203 with an alternate
enforcement mechanism to conclude that the regulatory scheme
was no longer capable of being enforced 08 and that Congress
had intended the competitive market, which included state law
protections, to further the goals of §§ 201-02.109 The court also
relied on both the legislative history of the 1996 Act and the
context in which the 1996 Act was passed to demonstrate that
Congress intended a dramatic overhaul of the regulatory scheme
in which the preemptive effect of § 203 no longer played a role.110
To support this conclusion, the Ting court looked to the
emphasis which Congress placed on competition in the 1996
Act"'1 and the contemporary understanding in Congress that the
1996 Act would greatly decrease the regulatory involvement of
the FCC.112
To further support its conclusion that the detariffing
process represented a significant shift of power away from the
FCC, the Ting court also pointed to regulatory action by the
FCC that supported the market-based theory of enforcement. 113
In particular, the court cited the FCC's opinion and order in
Orloff v Vodafone Airtouch Licenses,114 an administrative
adjudication in which the FCC deferred to the market as a
means of enforcing the antidiscrimination standards of
§ 202(a).115 Moreover, the court noted the lack of a federal
107 Id at 1141, quoting MCI Telecommunications, 512 US at 229.
100 Ting, 319 F3d at 1142, quoting MCI Telecommunications, 512 US at 229
("Pursuant to the Court's interpretation of the regulatory scheme in MCI, unless
Congress replaced the filing requirement with an alternative means of enforcement, the
regulatory scheme is not 'susceptible of effective enforcement' following detariffing.").
100 Ting, 319 F3d at 1142 ("Congress' new market-based method contains no such
restriction [like the filed-rate doctrine]. The market not only encourages carriers to
remain flexible, it protects consumers through state contract and consumer protection
laws, and ensures reasonable rates through competition rather than rate filing.").
n0 Id at 1143.
n1 Id.
112 See Ting, 319 F3d at 1143, quoting Cong Rec S8188-04, S8197 (daily ed June 12,
1995) ("Congress envisioned the 1996 Act as a dramatic break with the past that would
revolutionize long distance service by greatly decreasing the scope of the FCC's role. The
Senate floor manager, Senator Larry Pressler, stated that '[tihis is the most
comprehensive deregulation of the telecommunications industry in history."').
n1 Id at 1145.
114 17 FCCR 8987 (2002) (hereinafter "Orloff Opinion and Order").
115 Ting, 319 F3d at 1144, citing Orloff Opinion and Order, 17 FCCR at 8996-97
("[Orloff] demonstrates that while the FCC continues to 'govern' § 201 and § 202, state
law is no longer excluded as it was under the filed rate doctrine, because Congress's
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common law of contracts under which the FCC could arbitrate
disagreements such as the one at issue in Ting.116 Since federal
common law is limited to situations in which there is significant
conflict between state and federal law, and creation of federal
common law is disfavored, the court reasoned that the
conspicuous absence of federal common law weighed in favor of
relying on state law to arbitrate disputes.117 For these reasons,
the Ting court concluded that there was no conflict between
permitting state law challenges and the method of enforcement
of §§ 201-02 established by Congress in the 1996 Act.118 Having
thus determined that state law challenges conflicted with
neither the purpose for which Congress enacted the FCA nor the
method of enforcement that Congress intended, the Ting court
held that the plaintiffs' state law-based challenges to the terms
of the CSA were not preempted.119 While the specific holding of
the Ting court applied only to the specific California laws in
question, language underpinning the holding states that state
law is not preempted by §§ 201-02 as long as the state law is
part of a competitive market framework. 120 By referencing
"[s]tate contract and consumer protection laws" in the general
sense and "state laws of general applicability," the court implies
that the FCA does not preempt essentially any state law which
bears on rates, terms, and conditions of consumer
telecommunications contracts. 121
D. The In re Universal Decision: The Tenth Circuit Sides with
the Seventh Circuit
Eight years after the Ting case, the Tenth Circuit joined the
circuit split when it issued its decision in In re Universal.122 The
market-based mechanism permits-indeed, depends upon-the imposition of state
law.").




120 See Ting, 319 F3d at 1145 ("By definition, the deregulated marketplace
encompasses state laws of general applicability. Here, California's unconscionability law
is not unlike that of most other states, and even if it were, it does not make an otherwise
competitive market non-competitive. The same can be said of the CLRA. State contract
and consumer protection laws, including California's CLRA and unconscionability law,
form part of the competitive framework to which the FCC defers.").
121 See id.
122 619 F3d at 1188.
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In re Universal opinion is the result of multidistrict litigation
involving numerous putative class action suits against multiple
defendants, including AT&T.123 AT&T moved to compel
arbitration based on the consumer service agreements in place
with the plaintiffs. 124 The district court granted the request as it
applied to all non-California plaintiffs, holding that the request
was collaterally estopped for California plaintiffs based on the
district court decision in Ting,125 which was later affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit. 126 The non-California plaintiffs appealed, alleging
that state law unconscionability provisions invalidated the
arbitration clause contained in the CSA. 127 The Tenth Circuit,
like the Seventh, held that the FCA preempts state law
challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of consumer
telecommunications contracts. 128 The In re Universal court
focused its analysis on two main issues: (1) whether the
uniformity principle of §§ 201-02 survived detariffing;129 and (2)
the precise contours of preemption post-detariffing. 13 0 While the
issue of survival of the uniformity principle is key to both the
Boomer and Ting opinions, the In re Universal court was the
first to address the exact scope of conflict preemption.131
In considering whether the uniformity principle survived
detariffing-and ultimately determining that it did-the In re
Universal court first examined the language of the statute in
order to determine congressional intent. 132 The court found that
the antidiscrimination principles embodied in both § 201(b) and
§ 202(a) "demonstrate[d] a congressional intent that individual
long-distance customers throughout the United States receive
uniform rates, terms and conditions of service." 133 Unlike the
Ting court, the In re Universal court did not find it dispositive
that the body of case law on the uniformity principle "focus[ed]
predominantly on § 203's filed-rate doctrine rather than the
123 Id at 1194.
124 Id at 1194-95.
125 182 F Supp 2d 902 (ND Cal 2002).
126 See In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1195. See also Ting, 319 F3d at 1152.
127 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1195.
128 See id at 1200-01.
129 Id at 1197-99.
1so Id at 1200-02.
131 See In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1199-1202.
132 Id at 1197-98.
133 Id at 1198, quoting Boomer, 309 F3d at 418.
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uniformity principle embodied in §§ 201 and 202."134 The In re
Universal court interpreted that focus as arising from the
centrality of § 203 as an enforcement mechanism in the tariffing
regime rather than as an indication of the source of the
uniformity principle.135 In line with this, the court noted that
post-detariffing cases focused heavily on §§ 201-02.136 The court
reasoned that the language of the 1996 Act indicated the
preservation of the uniformity principle.13 7 Indeed, rather than
authorizing a blanket forbearance from applying § 203, the 1996
Act authorized forbearance when consistent with the principles
of §§ 201-02.138 To the In re Universal court, this formulation
constituted an explicit mandate by Congress that "the
uniformity goals of §§ 201 and 202 would remain, even in the
event the FCC determined the then-existing means of achieving
this uniformity, § 203's filed-rate doctrine, was no longer the
preferred mechanism for accomplishing this goal." 139
Once the In re Universal court determined that the
uniformity principle remained in force after the FCC's
detariffing order, it turned its focus to delineating the "precise
scope of the uniformity principle set out in §§ 201 and 202."140
Implicit in this analysis was an indication by the court that at
least some preemption existed in the FCA context-the question
remained how much. After finding little postdetariffing case law
on the exact scope of §§ 201-02, the court focused its attention
on the opinions of the FCC issued in administrative
adjudications. Specifically, the court found the FCC's response to
AT&T's request for clarification as to the effect of detarriffing on
the preemptive scope of §§ 201-02 relevant. 141 In its response,
the FCC stated that § 201 and § 202 of the Communications Act
"continue[d] to govern determinations as to whether rates,
terms, and conditions for interstate, domestic, interexchange
services are just and reasonable, and are not unjustly or
unreasonably discriminatory," but that "the Communications
134 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1198.
135 Id.
3 Id.
"' Id at 1199.
138 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1199.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id at 1200.
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Act d[id] not govern other issues, such as contract formation and
breach of contract, that arise in a detariffed environment."1 4 2
The In re Universal court found that this order clearly
delineated the FCC's opinion on the scope of preemption: §§ 201
and 202 preempted state law challenges to rates, terms, and
conditions but did not preempt challenges to other contract
issues.143
However, the In re Universal court still had to decide
whether the opinion of the FCC was dispositive. First, the court
looked to Wyeth v Levine 44 for guidance on this question. 145
Under Wyeth, "[a]n agency's conclusion that state law is
preempted is not necessarily entitled to deference."146 Rather,
"[t]he weight [ ] accorded the agency's explanation of state law's
impact on the federal scheme depends on [the interpretation's]
thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness." 1 4 7  After
concluding that the FCC's analysis was "consistent with the
FCA's overarching goal of prohibiting state-by-state variations
in the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate
telecommunications services," the court chose to defer to the
FCC's interpretation of the scope of §§ 201-02 in the detariffed
world. 148 Thus, the court held that the FCA preempted state law
challenges to rates, terms, and conditions but that the FCA did
not preempt challenges to other aspects of the contract, such as
formation, breach, and issues regarding the legal relationship
between the two parties. 149
E. Summing up: Key Issues in Conflict
In determining whether state law challenges to rates,
terms, and conditions of consumer telecommunications contract
142 See In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1200, quoting Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC
15014 at 77.
143 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1200.
1" 555 US 555 (2009).
u4 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1200.
16 Id.
141 Id, quoting Wyeth, 555 US at 577.
148 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1201-02.
1' See id at 1200-02, quoting Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Red 15014 at 77
("[T]he FCC ordered that §§ 201 and 202 of the Communications Act 'continue[d] to
govern determinations as to whether rates, terms, and conditions for interstate,
domestic, interexchange services are just and reasonable.' . . . The district court's
deferral to the FCC's order .. . is therefore correct.").
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conflict with the purposes and intended methods of Congress
and are thus preempted, these circuit courts focused on two
main issues. First, the courts analyzed whether allowing state
law challenges to the rates, terms, and conditions of consumer
telecommunications contracts frustrated the overarching
purposes of Congress in enacting the FCA. Second, the courts
considered whether allowing such state law challenges conflicted
with the method of enforcement Congress envisioned for the
FCA. While the courts approached the analysis slightly
differently, the analysis in all cases was governed by the
obstacle conflict preemption standard from Crosby: state law
must not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."so
1. Do state law challenges conflict with the purpose of
Congress in enacting the FCA?
Regarding the first prong of these courts' analyses, the key
overarching purpose of the FCA the circuit courts identified is
the "uniformity principle"-the Congressional intention that
customers receive uniform terms and conditions of service.
Indeed, all three circuit courts agreed that §§ 201-03, taken
together, demonstrate Congressional endorsement of the
uniformity principle. 15 1 The courts differed, however, on the
question of whether the uniformity principle survived the
demise of § 203 as a primary enforcement mechanism. Both the
Boomer and the In re Universal courts held that the uniformity
principle survived the detariffing process, while the Ting court
held that it did not because § 203 was a key part of the statutory
text which led to the principle. 152 To reach this holding, the
Boomer court held that, far from being a key component of the
uniformity principle, "[s]ection 203 . . . merely served as a
mechanism by which the FCC could assure compliance with the
standards set forth in [s]ections 201 and 202."153 The Boomer
court further found that "[f]ollowing detariffing, [the goals of the
15 Crosby, 530 US at 372, quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941).
151 There is disagreement as to how much of §§ 201-03 must be taken together to
obtain the uniformity principle. The Ting court held that § 203 is required, see Ting, 319
F3d at 1138, while the Boomer and In re Universal courts held that §§ 201-02 are
sufficient. See Boomer, 309 F3d at 422; In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1197.
152 See Ting, 319 F3d at 1138.
153 Boomer, 309 F3d at 421.
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uniformity principle] remain, as do the substantive
requirements of Sections 201 and 202."154 Similarly, the In re
Universal court held that "the uniformity principle embodied in
§§ 201 and 202 of the FCA survived detariffing."655 In contrast,
the Ting court held that "the principle of uniformity is not
derived from § 202(a) alone, but from the [§ 203] mandate to
publish rates together with the discrimination principles
reflected in §§ 201(b) and 202(a)."156 The disagreement between
the circuit courts over the survival of the uniformity principle in
the detariffed world is central to the circuit split.
2. Do state law challenges conflict with the methods of
enforcement of the FCA Congress intended?
Regarding the second prong of these courts' analyses, the
key question the circuit courts analyzed was whether Congress
intended disputes over rates, terms, and conditions to be
governed exclusively by federal law or whether Congress left
room for state law to supplement federal law in this area. The
Boomer court found that permitting state law challenges was
both unnecessarily duplicative of the standards of fairness and
reasonableness embodied in § 201 and likely to lead to conflicts
with the resolution of such disputes under federal law.15 7 Thus,
the Boomer court found that "Congress intended federal law to
govern the validity of the rates, terms and conditions of long-
distance service contracts." 58 In contrast, the Ting court found
that "Congress' fundamental purpose in enacting the 1996 Act
was to replace the old monopoly-based regime with one based on
market competition."15 9 Thus, the court held that the success of
that "market-based method depend[ed] in part on state law for
the protection of consumers in the deregulated and competitive
marketplace," thereby creating a "complimentary [sic] role
between federal and state law" in the detariffed environment.o60
The In re Universal court did not address the issue of Congress's
planned FCA enforcement method, instead deciding that the
1s4 Id.
'55 In re Universal, 619 F3d at 1197.
156 Ting, 319 F3d at 1138 (emphasis omitted).
1"7 See Boomer, 309 F3d at 420-21.
15 Id at 420.
'59 Ting, 319 F3d at 1141.
160 Id.
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survival of the uniformity principle was sufficient to find
preemption. 161
III. RESOLVING THE SPLIT
The holding of the Boomer and In re Universal courts that
state law challenges to rates, terms, and conditions of consumer
telecommunications contracts are preempted is the proper
resolution to this circuit split. Two recent Supreme Court
decisions provide significant support to the position of these two
circuit courts. First, with regard to the inquiry into Congress's
purpose for the FCA, the Supreme Court's 2007 holding in
Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc v Metrophones
Telecommunications, Incl62-that Congress, in enacting the 1996
Act, expected the FCC to continue applying the principles
embodied by § 201 163-lends strong support to the argument
that the uniformity principle survived detariffing. Second, with
regard to the inquiry into Congress's method of FCA
enforcement, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona v
United States164 indicates that purposeful nonregulation by
Congress and purposeful nonexercise of regulatory power by the
executive branch165 are each preemptive of a complementary role
for state law.166
A. Global Crossing: Uniformity Survived Detariffing
In Global Crossing, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue
of whether the FCC's regulatory definition of "unreasonable
practice" under FCA § 201(b) was a reasonable statutory
interpretation. 167 In the case, Metrophones, a payphone
operator, sued Global Crossing, a long-distance carrier, under
the FCA's private right of action. 168 Metrophone based its case
161 See notes 132-143 and accompanying text.
162 550 US 45 (2007).
163 See id at 57.
164 132 S Ct 2492 (2012).
'6 Note that the FCC, while constitutionally part of the executive branch, is an
independent agency. See 47 USC 154.
166 See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505-07.
167 Global Crossing, 550 US at 55-59. The court applied the standard from Chevron,
USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984).
1s See Global Crossing, 550 US at 52. The FCA's private right of action is located at
47 USC § 207.
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on the FCC's identification of certain business practices as
"unreasonable practices," which are prohibited under § 201.169
Among other things, Global Crossing's amici alleged in defense
that the FCC's interpretation of the word "practice" in § 201
originated in a tariffed environment, but in the detariffed
environment, the word "practice," and the phrase "unreasonable
practices," might have had different meanings. 17 0 Thus, Global
Crossing argued that the FCA's § 201 prohibition on
"unreasonable practices" might apply differently, or not at all,
after detariffing.171 The Court, however, disagreed, holding that
the FCC's interpretation of the statutory language survived
detariffing.17 2
The analogy between the Global Crossing case and the
disagreement between the Ting, In re Universal, and Boomer
courts over the survival of the uniformity principle is striking.
Just like the plaintiffs in these cases, Global Crossing argued
that a legal principle which existed prior to detariffing did not
survive detariffing. Given this similarity, the Court's decision in
Global Crossing is instructive.
While the Global Crossing Court recognized that tariff filing
was the traditional centerpiece of the FCC's regulatory regime
and that the detariffed regime was different from the tariffed
regime in significant ways, the Court did "not concede that these
differences require[d] a different outcome."173 Although the
Court noted that the market had changed drastically, it found
the fact that "when Congress rewrote the law to bring about
[detariffing], it nonetheless left § 201(b) in place" to indicate a
congressional intent to preserve portions of the previous
regulatory regime.174 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "the
statute [following the 1996 amendments] permit[ed], indeed it
suggest[ed] that Congress likely expected, the FCC to pour new
substantive wine into its old regulatory bottles." 75 With this
language, the Court thus endorsed the proposition that the
principles central to §§ 201-02 survived the demise of § 203.
169 See Global Crossing, 550 US at 52.
170 See id at 57.
171 See id.
172 See id.
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Admittedly, it could be argued that the uniformity principle is a
fundamentally different concept than a single FCC statutory
interpretation. Furthermore, since this is a Chevron deference
case, the treatment of the FCC's statutory interpretation by the
Court is quite gentle.176 But because the FCC has endorsed the
continued preemptive effect of §§ 201-02,177 Chevron deference
may be due to that stance as well.1 78 While this decision by the
Court may not be dispositive, it makes it far more likely that the
uniformity principle survived detariffing. And because this
conclusion disfavors differing state law regimes, it weighs
heavily in favor of the argument that §§ 201-02 have an ongoing
preemptive effect.
B. Arizona: Conscious Federal Inaction Preempts State Action
In Arizona v United States, four elements of Arizona's
recently enacted immigration statute, "SB 1070," were
challenged by the United States on preemption grounds. 179 The
Court struck down three of the challenged requirements as
preempted and allowed the fourth to stand until its
interpretation and implementation became more concrete. 1s0
The Arizona ruling is a notable development in preemption
jurisprudence because the offending provisions of state law at
issue in the case, rather than obviously conflicting with federal
law, were at least superficially in harmony with it.181 The
Court's rulings on two of the challenged provisions, § 5(C) and
§ 6, have implications for the law of conflict preemption.
Section 5(C) of SB 1070 provided for criminal penalties for
immigrants who sought work despite not being authorized to
116 Indeed, the Court sounds almost dubious when it states that "this circumstance,
by indicating that Congress did not forbid the agency to apply § 201(b) differently in the
changed regulatory environment, is sufficient to convince us that the FCC's
determination is lawful." Id.
177 See Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC at 15057 (cited in note 48).
17s The issue of what level of deference an agency's own interpretation of its
jurisdiction is due is currently before the Supreme Court. See City of Arlington, Texas v
Federal Communications Commission, 668 F3d 229 (2012), cert granted 133 S Ct 524
(2012).
179 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2497. The Arizona statute at issue in the case was the
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz Legis Serv Ch
211, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2929.
1so Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2510.
1a1 See id at 2503, 2505.
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work in the United States. 182 Rather than conflicting with a
federal statutory scheme, § 5(C) operated in an area not
addressed by federal law.183 Specifically, federal law, while it
implemented a comprehensive scheme to reduce employment of
illegal aliens by placing legal sanctions on employers, 184 was
silent on the issue of criminal penalties for employees.185
Nonetheless, despite the lack of direct conflict with a federal
statute, the Court held that § 5(C) disrupted the regulatory
scheme of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA)186 and was thus preempted. 187
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
because Congress had provided a "comprehensive framework"
for enforcing employment restrictions on illegal aliens and
because the legislative history of the IRCA demonstrated that
Congress intentionally chose not to impose criminal penalties,
§ 5(C) of SB 1070 represented a "conflict in the method of
enforcement" chosen by Congress.188 Then, the Court relied on
preemption precedents stating that "[clonflict in technique can
be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict
in overt policy"189 and that "[wihere a comprehensive federal
scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field
without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be drawn-
not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with
action"190 to hold that the Arizona statute creating this "conflict
in the method of enforcement" was preempted.191
The legal principle-that a state law which regulates an
area that Congress chose not to regulate while enacting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme over a broader area can be
conflict preempted-has significant implications for the FCA
rates, terms, and conditions preemption question. As in Arizona,
Congress's decision in enacting the 1996 Act to leave §§ 201-02
182 Id at 2503. Section 5(C) of SB 1070 is codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2928(C).
183 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2503.
18 See 8 USC § 1324a(a)(1). See also Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2504.
185 See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2504.
1se Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (1986).
187 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505.
188 Id at 2504-05.
189 Id at 2505, quoting Motor Coach Employees v Lockridge, 403 US 274, 287 (1971).
19 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505, quoting Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs v
Isla Petroleum Corp, 485 US 495, 503 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
181 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505.
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without a specific federal enforcement mechanism 92 represents
"a comprehensive federal scheme [that] intentionally leaves a
portion of the regulated field without controls"193-in this case,
without an enforcement mechanism beyond the general
enforcement power of the FCC under §§ 205 and 208 of the
FCA. 194 Furthermore, Congress's affirmative abrogation of the
previous enforcement mechanism (tariffing) strongly suggests
that the lack of a specific enforcement mechanism is by design.
It then follows that state law intrusion into the enforcement of
§§ 201-02, a regime which Congress clearly intended to leave
without specific controls, conflicts with the method of
enforcement Congress intended in the detariffed environment.
The Arizona case also challenged § 6 of SB 1070, which
authorized state officers to arrest any person who the officers
have probable cause to believe has committed an offense which
makes that person removable from the United States. 195 As with
§ 5(C), § 6 did not directly conflict with the purpose of any
federal laws.19 6 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that § 6
impinged on the statutory grant of enforcement discretion to the
federal government. 197 Even though deportation is an area in
which state law has some room to operate, the Court held that
the encroachment of the Arizona state law into an area in which
Congress had delegated enforcement discretion to the executive
branch resulted in preemption of § 6.198
This holding also informs the FCA rates, terms, and
conditions preemption analysis. As with removal of illegal
192 The FCC's general methods of enforcing §§ 201-02 have not been abrogated by
Congress in any sense. The FCC continues to have enforcement power under § 205 and
§ 208 of the FCA. See 47 USC §§ 205, 208.
193 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505, quoting Isla Petroleum Corp, 485 US at 503.
194 See 47 USC §§ 205, 208.
195 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505. Section 6 of SB 1070 is codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann
§ 13-3883(A)(5).
19r See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2505-06. Indeed, federal law also authorizes
proceedings to remove such persons from the country. Id.
197 See id at 2506 ("By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be
detained for being removable, § 6 violates the principle that the removal process is
entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.").
198 Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2507 ("In defense of § 6, Arizona notes a federal statute
permitting state officers to 'cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification,
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
States.' . . . By nonetheless authorizing state and local officers to engage in these
enforcement activities as a general matter, § 6 creates an obstacle to the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.") (citation omitted).
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aliens, the regulation of consumer telecommunications contracts
is an area in which there is a role for state law.199 Indeed, if that
were not the case, field preemption would apply. State law, as
discussed in Part II.D, can operate in areas of contract
formation, breach, and other areas ancillary to rates, terms, and
conditions. 200 And as with immigration enforcement, Congress
has delegated enforcement authority to the executive branch-in
this case, the FCC.20 1 It then follows that state law impingement
on the statutory grant to the FCC to regulate rates, terms, and
conditions conflicts with the enforcement regime intended by
Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
As discussed in Part II.E, two main disagreements
constitute the FCA rates, terms, and conditions preemption split
between three of the federal circuit courts. The first such
disagreement is represented by the divide between the holdings
of the Seventh and Tenth circuits that the uniformity principle
survived the detariffing process and the Ninth Circuit's holding
that the uniformity principle was inextricably linked to the
tariffing regime of § 203. The uniformity principle weighs
strongly in favor of preemption because a regime in which state
law is allowed to operate would result in non-uniform rates,
terms, and conditions of service. The Supreme Court's decision
in Global Crossing suggests that the underlying principles of
§§ 201-02, including the uniformity principle, survived
detariffing. This fact weighs heavily in favor of the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits' position that the FCA preempts state law under
the uniformity principle.
The second such disagreement is the divergence between
the Seventh Circuit's holding that state law regulation of rates,
terms, and conditions is incompatible with federal enforcement
and the Ninth Circuit's holding that state law regulation would
199 See, for example, Boomer, 309 F3d at 424 ("[Flollowing detariffing, there appears
to be some role for state law."). See also Ting, 319 F3d at 1136 ("[Flield preemption is not
an issue because state law unquestionably plays a role in the regulation of long-distance
contracts.").
200 See text accompanying note 149.
201 See 47 USC § 151 ("[Tjhere is created a commission to be known as the 'Federal
Communications Commission' .. . which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this
chapter."). As before, note that the FCC is an independent agency. See note 165.
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effectively supplement federal regulation in this area. If state
law regulation is indeed incompatible, it serves as an obstacle to
the full accomplishment of the purposes of Congress and is thus
preempted. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Arizona v United
States-in which the Court held that intentional nonregulation
by Congress and nonexercise of regulatory power by the
executive branch each preempt state law methods of
enforcement-supports the Seventh Circuit's analysis and
ultimate finding of incompatibility. Given these two recent legal
developments, the rulings of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
that the FCA preempts state law challenges to rates, terms, and
conditions of telecommunications contracts should prevail over
the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the FCA does not preempt state
law in this way.
